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Political Violence and Radicalization in the North-








Political Violence has recently become a recurring decimal in Northern 
Nigeria especially in the North-Eastern part of the country where peace 
seems to have eluded the region since 2009. Several scholarly inputs were 
propounded in an attempt to address and find a lasting solution to the 
persistent incidence of violence ravaging the region. This article is another 
attempt geared toward addressing the problem by looking at it from a different 
perspective that is the youth Bulge Phenomenon. It is the conception of this 
paper that, the genesis, the life span and the demise of political violence is 
greatly influence by the socio-cultural and political environment surrounding 
it. To understand political violence and the factors that breed it, one has to 
understand the environment that actually nurtured it. In other words, without 
understanding the socio-political attributes of a given population, one will not 
understand the causes of insurgency within it. This paper views environment 
as a key factor in understanding the political violence within the context of 
the North-Eastern Nigeria.  It examines environment from a demographic 
parlance and adopts the youth Bulge theory and the social identity theory to 
conceptually analyse the key elements that continue to shape and mould the 
growth of political violence in the North-Eastern Nigeria, where institutional 
weakness due to poor governance, social categorization and the formation 
of social network were discovered to be the contributing factors to the 
menace. 
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INTRODUCTION
Recently the Nigeria state appear to have been in the front cover of the world 
newspapers for a very ugly reason of the unprecedented political violence 
occurring in different parts of the country but with specific dominance in 
the north-eastern geo-political zone where the activities of the Boko Haram 
miscreants appear to constitute a serious security challenge to the policy 
makers and the citizens as well, in the sense that incidence of political 
violence such as the abduction of Chibok girls, the attacked on military 
barracks and the capturing of several towns and cities in the North-Eastern 
Nigeria  has indeed generated a serious havoc which was never witnessed 
before in the country (Mohammed, 2014).
 It is imperative to note that the North-eastern geo-political zone has 
since 2009 continued to witness a deadliest political uprising and violence 
unleash on it by a group of miscreants popularly called the Boko Haram, 
who are rated in 2012 as the second dangerous group of insurgence in the 
world, having murdered about of 1,132 individuals in 364 attacks, a record 
surpassed only by the Taliban, who massacred about 1,842 persons in 525 
attacks (Egharevba & Aghedo, 2013). It is imperative to note that a study 
conducted by the University of Maryland on global terrorism in the late 2013 
revealed that Boko Haram related deaths by far superseded those inflicted 
by the Maoists in India and Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Al-Qaeda in Iraq 
(Osumah, 2013; LeVan, 2013).
 The incidence of political violence in the north-eastern Nigeria 
has gone beyond humanitarian and security concerns as it has appears to 
adversely challenge the political sovereignty of the Nigerian state, where the 
insurgency metamorphosed from guerrilla attacks to a full-pledge warfare 
involving the capturing and exercising control over territory, where by the 
mid-September 2014, the insurgents had overran and captured 25 towns in 
Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states, with a landmass of approximately 20,000 
sq km, about the size of the state of Maryland in the U.S or Wales in the 
United Kingdom (Mohammed, 2014).
 Against the above background, several studies were conducted 
to explore and explain the root cause of political violence in Northern 
Nigeria where factors such as colonial heritage, endemic poverty and youth 
unemployment were identified by scholars as responsible for the persistent 
violence (Awofeso, Ritchie & Degelin, 2003; Falola, 2009; Adetoro, 2010; 
Adesoji, 2011 & Adibe, 2012). However, in contrast this paper posit that such 
ugly scenario is principally an aftermath of the youth Bulge phenomenon 
which paved the way for the existence of traumatized and socially excluded 
Almajiri demographic cohort who are highly vulnerable to violence.
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 It is imperative to note that, Northern Nigeria has the highest birth 
rate in the country (Aluaigba, 2009). The region also manifests highest 
poverty rate, illiteracy, and unemployment, accompany by an explosive 
youth demographic cohort (Olaniyan, 2015). The Almajiri system constitute 
a serious social hazard by promoting begging culture and street children, in 
which as at 2014 there are about 9.5 million Almajirai roaming the street 
of northern Nigeria who are mostly between the age of 15 and 25 (Taiwo, 
2014). With a population of about 167 million people, in which about 20 per 
cent are between the age of 15 and 24, with 39.9 per cent unemployment rate, 
where youth unemployment representing 50 per cent of this total. As argued 
by the youth bulge theorists, any society with the above attribute has a strong 
tendency for violent conflict (Urdal, 2006). 
 The youth bulge theory therefore provides a framework for identifying 
and analysing the root cause of political violence and radicalization in 
northern Nigeria where there is a sharp division of the society along religion 
and ethnic lines. However, there is the need to further look at contextual 
factors such as governance and politics, in the sense that the mainstream 
literature linked youth Bulge with violence through the instrument of 
generational consciousness of common identity, sense of belonging and 
collectivism (Urdal; 2011, Bristow, 2015). However, such body of knowledge 
do not seem to be backup by any empirical evidences in the sense that we 
are yet to witness any incidence of political violence along age demarcation, 
hence the generational approach in explaining the youth bulge syndrome 
in relation to political violence possess an inherent weakness regarding it 
explanatory power of the nexus between youth bulges and political violence. 
Though there is no disputing the fact that the development of consciousness 
through group identity and sense of belonging are instrumental in unleashing 
a collective violence, it however, it may be flaw to attributes such identity 
and sense of belonging only to generational consciousness as the main factor 
in explaining the increasing tendency for involvement in violence by large 
youth cohort. 
 This is because, the generational approach has fail to provide adequate 
explanations of the motives behind the youth involvement in rebellious 
movement, it also fails to offer concrete explanation of the conditionality’s 
that contributed to development of such generational consciousness. It can 
therefore be argued that if a mere feelings of generational consciousness by 
clear large youth cohort is enough reason to trigger violence, then incidence 
of youth revolts   would have been a lot more phenomenon. It is imperative 
to notes that the circumstances providing youth bulges with the motives 
and opportunities to engage in political violence differ considerably among 
countries more so as even countries with the existences of large youth cohort 
is not all the youth that engage in political violence (Sommers, 2010). 
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 This work therefore tried to fill this research gap by critically 
examining the youth bulge linkages with political violence through an 
in-depth contextual analysis of the general structure of the youth so as to 
ascertain the contextual and underlying factors that makes some youth 
more prone to violence than others in the same geographical context and 
also to identify the factors that provided the youth a bonding mechanism for 
collective action because the generational conscious studies have failed to 
do so (Collier, 2011). This serve as the only means of avoiding stigmatizing 
and guilt generalization on the basis of youth poverty and unemployment as 
suggested by previous researches for instance (Aghedo, 2013). Contextual 
analysis in this parlance also offer a significant contribution, in bringing to 
limelight what the policy makers need to do in order to support vulnerable 
youth so as to prevent them from being radicalize into violence.
CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION
The Concept of Almajiri
The concept of Almajiri was coined from an Arabic word “Almuhajir” which 
connotes a migrant, the word is therefore use to describe the students of 
an informal Arabic schools called the Almajiri system which dates back to 
the eleventh century. In the pre-colonial period, Almajirai lived with their 
guardians and were attending school in a demarcated place called a tsangaya. 
However, the political and social changes accompanying the Usman Dan-
Fodio jihad (1804–1808), resulted in structural transformation of the system 
which saw the creation of an inspectorate of Qur’anic and Arabic studies, 
which invariably served as a regulative mechanism thereby representing 
an important milestone in the annals of Qur’anic education in Nigeria 
(Muhammad, 2014).
The amalgamation of the northern and southern protectorate in 
1914 marked the establishment of the Nigerian state, a development that 
was accompanied by the modernization of vast urban areas thereby placing 
significant numbers of the Almajiri schools in these urban areas. This therefore 
created a situation in which peoples from the rural areas send their kids to 
these urban communities, such as, Maiduguri and Kano which were eminent 
as center for Qur’anic education (Baba 2010). With increasing presence of the 
Almajiri school students in these urban areas, the pattern of the relationship 
between these students and their teachers therefore turned out to increasingly 
draw the interest of researchers and security experts (Muhammad, 2014).
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The Almajiri system represent a system in which a large youth cohort 
between the ages of three and twelve, are sent by their parents to a system 
of Islamic boarding school, in order to study the Qur’an under an individual 
Islamic scholar popularly refer to as Malam. Once enlisted, the desire is that 
the young men will study the Qur’an, and contribute to the welfare of their 
teacher, as well as the discharge of other domestic obligations. The Learning 
process, by and large would continue until the student’s reach graduation 
normally in their mid-twenties (Muhammad, 2014).
The Concept of Youth Bulge
The concept of “youth bulge” was coined by Gunnar Heinsohn a German 
social scientist which was latter by popularized Gary Fuller and Jack 
Goldstone in the 1990s (Hoffman & Jamal, 2012; LaGraffe, 2012). The 
advocates of this school of thought argued that “societies characterized by 
a youth bulge (a burgeoning youth population) while simultaneously facing 
limited resources and, in particular, a lack of prestigious positions for ‘surplus’ 
youngsters…. are much more prone to social unrest and acting belligerent 
towards their neighbors than those societies without these demographic 
stressors” (Schomaker, 2013, p. 117). 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This paper intends to revolve around two theoretical paradigms the Youth 
Bulge theory and the Social Identity Theory. The justification for that is 
that while the Youth Bulge Theory advocated that political and institutional 
weakness amidst demographic transition could lead to the eruption of 
political violence when democracy and good governance are not fully 
internalized. This provides an explanation of the potency of bad Governance 
in promoting political violence and radicalization process. However, the 
existence of demographic transition amidst political, institutional weakness 
are not sufficient to provide a mobilizing force for the youth to resort to 
violence there is a need for a bonding mechanism and identity building 
because political violence is a collective action this makes the social identity 
very relevant in strengthen the youth Bulge theory in this study.
The Youth Bulge Theory
The youth bulge theory has its theoretical bedrock on the notion that states 
characterized by political institutional weakness amidst demographic 
transitions manifest high vulnerability to political violence and social 
unrest, in the sense that there is higher tendency for the unemployed male 
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youth to resort to illegal means of seeking socioeconomic advancement. 
States that display attribute typical of the youth bulge conception are mostly 
found in the Middle East, Asia, the Pacific Islands and sub-Saharan Africa, 
which manifest a large youth cohort of over 30 per cent of the total adult 
populations (Schomaker, 2013; Hart, Atkins, Markey, & Youniss, 2004).
The nexus between youth bulge and political violence is therefore 
a growing field of research (Schomaker, 2013). However, it is imperative 
to note that such nexus is not automatic. This is because in every situation 
some variables play key intervening role between demography and violence 
(Aghedo, 2013). Some of these intervening conditions include relative 
deprivation, unemployment and urbanization, which as observed by LaGraffe 
(2012, p. 67), “demography acts as a “force multiplier,” aggravating these 
preexisting conditions, in which the alienation, frustration, and growing 
discontent arising from lack of sustainable livelihoods, along with other 
stressors, make the youth easily susceptible to mobilization for violence”. 
The youth bulge theory is operationally suitable in explaining the 
involvement of Almajirai in political violence in the sense that in Nigeria 
the youth constitute the lion share of the population at the epicentre of the 
societal transformation and social interaction (Olaniyan, 2015). However, 
the youth hardly plays any significant role politically as they always seem to 
be at the margin of the major political and socio-economic process. So when 
this feeling of hopelessness due to future despondency, economic repression 
and social exclusion combine with the perception of religious persecution 
the Almajirai cohort thus become easily susceptible to radicalism and violent 
extremism in order to find a way out of their predicaments. 
The Social Identity Theory
Social identity can therefore explain further how the Almajiris cohort 
subscribe to political violence in Nigeria, in the sense that there are two 
important factors very vital in explaining the linkage of social identity to 
violent extremism which are; insecure environment and bonding mechanism. 
It is therefore imperative to note that all these important conditionality’s are 
applicable to the Almajiri situation in the north-eastern Nigeria.
Beginning with an insecure environment, the Almajiris youth cohort 
depicts a clear-cut disadvantaged social class that have being subjected to 
deprivation and social exclusion. For instance, the Almajiris are denied of 
the opportunity for western education which automatically relegated them to 
second class citizens who do not have chances to excel in life. As observed 
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Crosby (1979), when individual or group consider themselves as unfairly 
disadvantaged in comparison with other group in same settings they have a 
strong tendency for rebelling against the system. This was exactly what Gurr 
(1970), observed earlier, when he argued that an existence of discrepancy 
between individual subjective value expectation and value capabilities 
resulted to rebellious tendency, where the former connotes conditions of 
life which individual believe they are entitled to while the latter depicts the 
conditions of life which individual thinks he is capable of attaining.
In Nigeria for instance, the government has practically fail to provide 
social security to the Almajiris cohort and the political system is designed in 
such a way that does not ensure inclusiveness of the Almajiri school system 
into the mainstream educational system, therefore depriving the Almajiri 
school graduates the opportunity to be relevant to the society. This therefore 
serves as the foundation for them to have feelings of alienation thereby 
devolving a parallel social institution with a distinct identity. The promoters 
of the idea of insurgency may capitalize on this by portraying troubling 
event such as mismanagement of resources, corruption, unemployment or 
economic recession in a particular parlance to justify taking arms against 
the state.
Regarding the bonding mechanism, there is no disputing the fact that 
an insurgency needs a strong mechanism that can tie its members together 
and ensure inflow of new recruit. In this parlance, culture and religion serve 
as strong instruments of social identity and brotherhood, which tend to create 
unity of purpose and direction especially in terms of uncertainty. Religion 
therefore, becomes an effective mechanism for recruitment and radicalization 
by the Boko Haram, in the sense that the insurgence leaders offer a radical 
interpretation of Islamic religion which underlines the Almajiri’s feeling 
of alienation and exclusion, in this parlance the radical interpretation  of 
religion not only promote awareness of the rationale behind the suffering 
of the Almajiris cohort but also provide a yardstick for identification and 
categorization of peoples as either “we” or “them”  and institutions as either 
“ours” or “theirs”
METHOD AND DATA
The paper employs a qualitative method in which secondary data was 
sourced and analysed descriptively to assess the relevance of the youth 
Bulge phenomenon and social identity in explaining Political Violence in the 
North-Eastern Nigeria. 
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ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
This section try to conceptually analysed the linkage between youth Bulge 
and Political Violence by exploring the environmental and political factors 
that have individually and collectively contributed in generating the feeling 
of hopelessness due to future despondency, economic repression, social 
exclusion and religious persecution among the Almajirai cohort thereby 
making them susceptible to radicalism and violent extremism in order to find 
a way out of their predicaments.
The paper therefore, tries to address and explore this problem from 
two important parlances; firstly, the youth bulge which tries to explore the 
relationship between bad Governance and political violence, the second 
parlance explore how social identity makes the linkage  between youth bulge 
and political violence even more stronger. 
Youth Bulge in The Persistency of Violence in the Northern Nigeria
Good governance is a process whereby the society’s resources is being 
managed transparently with accountability as well as given room for popular 
participation in governance among others by responsible leaders. It is 
imperative to note that the involvement of the Almajiris in political violence 
have a direct nexus with institutional weakness which lead to deprivation of 
some basic human needs in the areas of political and socioeconomic structures, 
which occurs due to lack of human agencies such as the government which 
may make the political system to favor discrimination, societal injustice, 
structural imbalance, unequal distribution of resources and social exclusion.
In Nigeria abject poverty and economic dislocation of livelihoods 
have drastically reduced the options of most Almajiris. Therefore, 
deducing from the youth Bulge theory, the Almajiris political grievances, 
such as discrimination and political marginalization, have constantly been 
used as mobilizing instruments by the Boko Haram elites to find support 
and recruits them for terrorism and political violence. This evidence was 
further supported by the released dozens of infantilized Almajiris previously 
detained as suspected Boko Haram members in May 2013 by the Nigerian 
government where significant portion of those youths were individuals who 
confessed to previously accepting payments of 5,000 Nigerian Naira from 
Boko Haram militants, who in turn provided them with kegs of fuel to set 
schools ablaze in Maiduguri, Borno State (Aghedo, 2013). This is indicative 
of the economic desperation expressed by thousands of youths who have 
been rendered vulnerable by the shortcomings of Nigeria’s leadership over 
several decades.
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The phenomenon of the “youth bulge” in Nigeria has further increased 
the steady supply of structurally marginalized and excluded youth cohorts of 
the Almajiri extraction who have become susceptible to recruitment by Boko 
Haram. More so as Nigeria is firmly within the category of a very young age 
structure, with nearly three-quarters of its population under the age of 30-38 
political violence inspired by marginalized youths in the country are stark 
reminders of the negative impact exceedingly large and mismanaged youth 
populations can exert across the world, the huge number of young people 
living on the margins of Nigerian society intensifies these linkages.
It is therefore evident from this study that the Almajiris cohorts were 
people who have been prevented by the society from achieving their set goals, 
because the ‘socio-politico’ structure of the northern Nigerian society had 
suffered from dysfunction and crumbling family structures, value system and 
discipline. Such a situation, produced frustrations, pressure and, of course, 
strain on the deprived Almajiris class to use whatever means possible even 
if such means were illegitimate with the aim of finding solutions to blocked 
opportunities. This is the kind of condition Merton described as the ‘Anomie 
Condition’. 
In the contemporary Nigeria, the citizens are socialized through 
Western education, as far as modern society is concerned, to aspire to higher 
opportunities, but the Almajiris cohorts who constitute the lower class or 
disadvantaged groups were relatively blocked from getting free conventional 
education, good occupations and basic social amenities, health care and 
other basic needs required to achieve legitimate goals. Hence, the Almajiris 
who were ‘blocked’ lose confidence in the society, and as a reaction to the 
structure of the society that denied them these basic needs, joined a radical 
group that could never see anything good with the Western philosophy 
that had modernized their hitherto relatively simple traditional culture and 
social life, where members were more or less the same to a more dominant 
institutionalized capitalist society where every man is for himself, and hence 
felt compelled to join the campaign of Boko Haram.
The Potency of Social Identity in Promoting Political Violence in 
Northern Nigeria 
Political violence requires having divided people into two categories: those 
whose interests are to be advanced through violent activities (“us”) and 
those against whom the violent activities are to be directed (“them”). This 
cognitive dichotomization extends beyond mere descriptive differentiation 
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to include an intense evaluative component as well. Those associated with 
“us” are viewed as moral, right, good, and strong. Those associated with 
“them” are seen as immoral, wrong, bad, and weak. The greater the extent to 
which cultural influences promote dichotomous cognitive structures, the less 
willing and able members of the culture may be to view the world from the 
perspective of the other. 
In the North-eastern Nigeria social categorization and group influence 
has immensely contributed in forging a strong nexus between the Almajiris 
cohorts and the Boko Haram elites via the link faith phenomenon, where 
access to western education stand out as one of the salient factor that 
promote the cognitive dichotomization between the Almajiris cohorts and 
the rest of the society. In the sense that the founder of the Boko Haram 
Muhammad Yusuf was a graduate of the Almajiri school who did not had the 
opportunity to attend the formal school, hence he shares same fate and social 
self-categorization (the ‘non-yan Boko” meaning those without western 
education) with the Almajiri cohorts which enable his ideology to possess a 
substantial influence among them. 
In the sense that the Almajiri demographic cohorts represent a large 
youth cohort with stronger ties religiously and culturally, in which the 
absence of participation in the institutions of the larger society compel them 
to create a parallel institution exclusively serving the group members. This is 
further confirmed by analyzing the Almajiri social network which manifested 
a web of social organization existing parallel with the formal institution in 
which owing to several decades of state negligence and societal pollution the 
Almajiri community developed a complex web of social network in which 
positions and ranks were assigned to individual members based on their 
relative knowledge and qualification.1 
Such social network therefore become responsible for coordinating 
the group’s activities, for recruitment of members, and has the ability to 
manipulate the flow of information within the group more easily. Since a 
relatively high number of members were tied to the network via a specific 
hub, this also implies that the hubs were responsible for recruitment 
processes. Structural characteristics of the network are associated with the 
group outcomes, internal social processes as well as members’ behavior, such 
as, the decision of whether or not to participate in its activities hence serve as 
an important mechanism for the Radicalization of the Almajiris demographic 
cohorts. 
  JGD  Vol. 13, Issue 2, July 2017, 1-13
11
CONCLUSION
To this end, an important missing link in the previous studies is their inability 
to explore the factors under which the Almajirai cohorts becomes expose 
to ideas and behavioural patterns which pave a way for their radicalization 
(Awofeso, Ritchie & Degelin, 2003; Falola, 2009; Adetoro, 2010; Adesoji, 
2011; Adibe, 2012; Aghedo, & Eke, 2013). This is because youth bulge 
syndrome is never an automatic cause of political violence other factors such 
as social identity play crucial role. In the available literature, little or no 
attention has been given to the how social identity and agitation for self-
governance has actually shaped the Boko Haram insurgency in the North-
eastern geo-political zone of Nigeria. A crucial point to be noted is that 
identity and agitations by the ethnic and social group have led to claims of 
marginalization and underdevelopment. A second point is that the jobless 
youths are motivated and mobilized by the leaders of sects and social class as 
instruments for conflicts in case of agitation, these points underlying social-
identity and the struggles for political relevance by the Boko Haram elites 
through the mobilization of the Almajirai demographic cohorts. 
To this end, the contribution of this study theoretically revolves around 
the exploration of how social identities plays a greater role in promoting 
political violence in the north-eastern Nigeria where poor governance only 
provided the fault-line but the bonding mechanism for collective violence 
was provided by socio-cultural identity, this study thus based its approach by 
adopting the Youth Bulge Theory and the Social Identity Theory. However, 
future research should also look at how the failure in the designs of youth 
empowerment policies and programmers contributed to the youth bulge 
syndrome in the country.
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